Lessons from Grenfell: we call for a review of ACP buildings and building standards by an independent body

Grenfell Tower in 2009

Following the deadly Grenfell Fire of last year, building standards and fire prevention methods have been called into question. New Zealand’s buildings have been the subject of scrutiny, to prevent such a fire happening here. The reviews of engineer, Tony Enright, and the Auckland Council have offered differing perspectives regarding the use of aluminium composite panelling (ACP). Despite the council’s insistence that buildings containing ACP do not pose an immediate threat, lingering queries remain. With a growing line of precedent, ranging from Grenfell, Dubai, China and Melbourne, a review of buildings and our New Zealand building standards by an independent external body is suggested.

Grenfell

On 14 June 2017, following an accidental fridge fire on the fourth floor, Grenfell Tower caught alight. The 24-story London building burned for almost 60 hours, resulting in 72 deaths, numerous injuries and the unveiling of a dangerously aging building code. Grenfell had undergone renovations in 2012 to 2016, which saw relatively cheap ACP cladding installed with a polyethylene core. This ACP cladding was later found to be a leading factor towards the rapid acceleration of flames. In the wake of the Grenfell disaster, the United Kingdom called for extensive testing of the common cladding. In 2014, The Lacrosse building in Melbourne’s Docklands caught fire due to a similar cladding that also failed combustibility standards. Some 500 residents were displaced, and over $2 million worth of damage resulted.  

The ACP cladding

Aluminium composite panelling is a common building material in the UK, Australia and New Zealand. ACP’s are “flat panels consisting of two thin coil-coated aluminium sheets bonded to a non-aluminium core”. These are regularly used in the external cladding of buildings and for building facades. PE (polyethylene), FR (fire-resistant) and A2 are the three most commonly used types of ACP in New Zealand; with FR being “the most widely used type of panel in New Zealand and Australia”. It is common practice to install these aluminium panels over one of two insulation materials: either rigid polyisocyanurate (PIR) or Stone Wool. Stone Wool is non-combustible, whereas PIR is combustible.

The UK Reports

Independent reviews of building regulations and fire safety standards were released in the UK on 17 May 2018, criticising the government’s ignorance of fire safety warnings. Aside from the combustible insulation and cladding, Grenfell tower did not feature fire sprinklers and had only a single staircase. Led by Dame Judith Hackitt, the independent report found that ignorant construction practices resulted in the fires impact. In the wake of Grenfell, the government also undertook extensive reviews of high-rise buildings known to carry similar panelling. 165 buildings later failed combustion tests and required re-cladding. The initial independent report did not recommend prohibiting building practices however, it has recently been announced that consultation is soon to begin regarding the banning of such cladding.  UK Housing Secretary, James Brokenshire, has stated that they “must create a culture that truly puts people and their safety first, that inspires confidence”, and this must be done through legislation. This has led to questioning about the construction materials used in New Zealand’s own high rise buildings.

The Enright Report dated 19 November 2017

Late last year, a leaked report surfaced online which was reported as urging for “the suspension of approval for widely used aluminium panel on high-rises”. Led by Dr Tony Enright, and commissioned by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Education, the leaked report investigated ACP cladding used in New Zealand. Enright’s report called for the suspension of six Certmark certificates. The report raises concerns over the fire code compliance of many buildings.  In cases, insufficient evidence and evaluation reports had been presented in the certification process.

Enright found the supporting information did not support claims of compliance and thus the six ACP identified should not have received certificates. The leaked Enright report noted UK full scale tests found that ACP panelling with PE core failed the external fire spread test regardless of their insulating material, ACP with an A2 core passed the external fire spread test regardless of insulating material and the ACP with an FR core passed with non-combustible insulation and failed with combustible PIR insulation. There were “reasonable grounds” to believe that the six types of ACP panelling would be unlikely to satisfy the performance requirement C3.5 regarding the vertical spread of fire.  

The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment response:

Despite initially commissioning the leaked Dr Enright Report, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) have expressed their concerns about it. MBIE has downplayed the findings, MBIE announced they believe Dr Enright’s report was not “completed satisfactorily”. MBIE affirmed that before suspending ACP products and restricting their use in construction, the Ministry would need “adequate evidential grounds” regarding the risk. MBIE did not say what would constitute ‘adequate evidential grounds’, nor why Dr Enright’s Report and events such as Grenfell and Melbourne’s Docklands Fire did not meet this threshold.

MBIE have stated that they are taking into account that a “suspension for every [aluminium composite panel] product in NZ would have considerable practical and commercial consequences for suppliers and the certifying body”.

The CertMark response

CertMark have responded to the ACP controversy following Grenfell, by ensuring the public that they are “confident that all ACP’s certified by us comply with the testing requirements stipulated by both the ABCB and MBIE”. According to CMI, the panelling involved with the Melbourne’s Docklands fire would not have been considered compliant and thus would not have been used in a high-rise building.  

The Auckland Council

The Auckland Council instigated an internal review of 209 high-rise buildings potentially consisting of ACP cladding. After assessment of 157 of those buildings, the council concluded there was no danger caused by the ACP cladding and immediate corrective action was not warranted. However, “in 23 cases the council could not determine what kind of material was used”. 25 buildings were “identified as having the aluminium composite panels (ACP) with a polyethylene core linked to the Grenfell tower disaster.” It is not specified whether these owners have been informed of their cladding type; nor if remedial work is to occur.

The council found that despite the fact that “some of the assessed buildings may not comply with the current Building Code , Auckland Council considers that a combination of fire prevention measures, fire safety systems and the extent of ACP coverage do not cause immediate concern for occupants’ safety”. Ian McCormick, General Manager Building Consents, stated that despite natural inferences that can be drawn from Grenfell, “comparisons shouldn’t be drawn… because the use of ACP in Auckland buildings is limited and associated with building features that reduce any potential risk, such as sprinkler systems”. A question arises about whether Auckland Council is the party that should undertake a cladding review when the Council likely certified many of these buildings during construction. 

Tightening of building codes internationally

Following fires in Dubai, the UAE “changed their building codes and do not allow the use of combustible cores in cladding”. In Dubai, the authorities are now insisting on a full-scale test for the cladding of tall buildings. Following the fire in Melbourne’s Docklands, the Victorian Building Authority audited their cladding, and updated national building codes. The Enright Report and international experience could indicate an independent building code review here would be worthwhile. 

Quick fixes and quiet litigation aren’t acceptable when the precedent is 72 lives lost through preventable practices. London Mayor, Sadiq Khan, stated: "those who mock health and safety, regulations and red tape need to take a hard look at the consequences of cutting these and ask themselves whether Grenfell Tower is a price worth paying.”  

What next?

In the UK a series of criminal investigations followed the Grenfell fire. On 27 July 2017, the police stated they had reasonable grounds to suspect corporate manslaughter by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, and by the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation. An independent public inquiry called the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has begun.

When looking at the large number of buildings in New Zealand’s cities containing ACP panelling, it seems an issue of whether we are doing enough. A New Zealand cladding investigation is surely a must; but are the Councils the parties that should undertake them?

To prevent an event like Grenfell happening in New Zealand, a wholesale review of our buildings and building standards by an independent external body is suggested with binding recommendations. Safety should triumph.